TNI AL and Littoral Navies Ties: Good, but Don’t be Too Focused on It
Apart from the joint effort with the Singapore Navy, TNI AL will launch a similar
coordinated patrol collaboration with the Royal Malaysia Navy (RMN). All in all,
the Strait of Malacca, including the tiny water corridor that runs along the Strait of
Singapore, is theoretically well-patrolled by the coastal states. Nevertheless, the recent Indonesia-Singapore naval/military partnership is worth emphasizing, since the top leaders of the two countries’ armed forces, TNI and
SAF respectively, are of Navy origin. Both Yudo Margono, from Indonesia, and
Aaron Beng Yao Cheng, from Singapore, were navy men, formerly in command of the
branch’s chief of staff office.
For Indonesia, which is the home of a huge water territory, the existing bilateral/multilateral ties with the littoral states of
the Strait of Malacca (SOM) are good - but do not be too focused on them. One has to
look at the other parts of its maritime domain and such an intention
unfortunately void with top TNI AL management. The eastern area of the
archipelago, starting from waters around islands of Java, Kalimantan, Maluku up
to Papua, for instance, requires more patrol in order to tackle human
trafficking, illegal narcotics transportation and other sea-borne illicit
activities.
So far, to monitor the eastern hemisphere of the country, TNI
AL heavily rely on a set of surveillance system provided by the US, under the
umbrella of Integrated Maritime Surveillance System (IMSS) in 2011. At a cost
of US$57 million, through a grant program, the system is comprised of 18 coastal surveillance
posts, 11 Automatic Identification System (AIS) radars and 4 command centers. The
facilities can cover an area of 1,285 km of Sulawesi Island among others. No
initiative of coordinated patrol like those implemented in the Strait of
Malacca to reinforce the mechanism.
The question is now what explanation can be established to
describe the imbalanced treatment of the securitization of maritime realm between
the western and eastern part of Indonesia, on the part of TNI AL?
First, from an economic perspective, the western part of
Indonesia, especially in the Strait of Malacca, has a massive economic value compared
to the straits in the eastern regions. As such, military/naval assets should be
deployed by the government to protect it, as a center of gravity. This economic
advantage is not only spurring a “white economy” but also the “black” one. The
latter refers to activities by thugs, often military personnel in forms of piracy or
blackmailing. There have been reports by foreign media on shakedown of foreign
flagged vessels around Batam Island by TNI AL personnel, but this is repeatedly denied by the institution, saying that the reportages were baseless.
Second, within the last two-three years, there has been an ongoing
fleet restructuring, wherein the 1st Fleet Command headquarters was
transferred to new premises in Tanjung Pinang, Riau Island province. With
this policy its supporting units, like the Sea Battle Taskforce (Gugus Tempur Laut or Guspurla as it is
known) is relocated as well; a little bit farther to Natuna Island. This is the
western flank of TNI AL structure, in which the Strait of Malacca lays, while its
Maritime Security Taskforce/Gugus Keamanan
Laut, of Guskamla for short, remains in Batam Island. Their former office
compound, a historical building for the Navy in Jakarta DKI, is occupied for
the newly-revived Greater Fleet Command of Komando
Armada Republik Indonesia in Bahasa Indonesia. This is a three-star post within TNI
AL hierarchy. President Sukarno set up this unit in the 1960s; it was dismantled by
President Suharto soon he took the power from the former. President Joko Widodo
revived the command through his Executive Order Number 66/2019, and formally
inaugurated by the then TNI Commander-in-Chief Andika Perkasa in 2022.
It might be safe to conclude that the full attention, as
indicated by the intensified bilateral cooperation with RSN and RMN to
safeguard the Strait of Malacca, is a hype. And it is. The removal of the 1st
Fleet Command was something apart from the plan. Its office indeed had to be shifted, but it was plotted to Banten Province, less than a hundred kilometers from
Jakarta. The location is close to the Strait of Sunda, a critical approach
to Indonesia from the sea. However, the zone is less guarded, at least, in terms
of the size of the naval base that oversees the chokepoint: its commandant is a
colonel, so it is hardly likely to anticipate any contingency. In TNI AL, the 2nd
Fleet Command in Surabaya, East Java Province, may be the most important among
the existing three fleet commands, i.e. 1st Fleet in Tanjung Pinang
and 3rd Fleet in Sorong, Papua. Almost all of the Navy Chiefs of
Staff ever seated at the 2nd Fleet commanded it. Nevertheless,
this unit is rarely in the media.
Third, increased bilateral ties among navies of the
littoral state of the Strait of Malacca are chosen by TNI AL, because they are the
easy to implement. Every Chief of Staff of the Navy will engage with such a program, operating with "business as usual" as soon as he assumes the position. For “heavier”
initiatives he needs more time and a strong commitment. On the other hand, in
Indonesia, the head of the branch will be only in charge of the helm for two or
three years and then retire. Unfortunately, this short period of time is
fully loaded with ceremonies and agendas, set up long before he grabs it, by his
predecessors, and he does not have the forcefulness to amend the events.
Diterbitkan dalam Independent Observer, Edisi Jumat, 31 Maret 2023
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